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This report examines the key uncertainties facing 
the UK’s planned low carbon transition, and 
identifies policies and strategies to mitigate or 
better understand them. It focuses on technical, 
economic, political and social uncertainties that 
could affect the achievement of agreed climate 
change targets between now and 2030.
The report shows that action can be taken to 
mitigate many of these uncertainties. In cases 
where it is not possible to significantly reduce 
them – at least in the short term – complementary 
strategies can be pursued. These include 
providing support for a diverse range of potential 
technologies and measures, and using trials 
and evaluations to identify those that are most 
effective. They also include making greater use 
of analytical tools that improve understanding of 
uncertainties and their potential impacts. 
The report reaches the following main conclusions:
1. Power sector decarbonisation by 2030 is 
essential if the UK’s emissions targets are to 
be met whilst minimising the costs of doing 
so. Whilst this will require large amounts of 
capital investment, there is no shortage of 
capital per se. However, further changes to 
policy frameworks, market structures and 
business models may be needed to attract that 
capital to the UK power sector. 
2. A limited range of large-scale low carbon 
electricity generation technologies can have an 
impact before 2030. All of them face economic, 
technical and political challenges. Given the 
financial resources required and the political 
tensions with some of these technologies, it 
will be tough for the government and industry 
to maintain momentum on all of them. It 
is therefore essential that any decisions to 
prioritise particular technologies are evidence-
based.
3. In contrast to the power sector, there is more 
flexibility with respect to heat and transport 
decarbonisation. Whilst there has been a 
focus on electrification of these sectors, other 
routes to decarbonisation (e.g. district heating 
or hydrogen vehicles) may also be significant. 
Since it is not yet clear what will be the best 
routes for reducing emissions in these sectors, 
a continuing emphasis on experimentation, 
demonstration and learning is needed. In many 
cases, these demonstrations should focus 
on non-technical factors such as consumer 
attitudes, business models and the extent to 
which regulatory frameworks need to change.
4. One corollary of this greater flexibility is the 
need for more action in the short-term on 
energy efficiency, particularly in buildings. 
Further progress with energy efficiency can 
help to buy time if the deployment of low 
carbon technologies is not as successful as 
planned. Energy efficiency is also an effective 
way to help to reduce consumers’ bills, 
especially if fossil fuel prices remain high
5. Engagement with people and communities is 
an essential component of the UK’s low carbon 
transition. Genuine engagement is needed so 
that public attitudes to energy system change 
– and not just to individual technologies - are 
taken into account. This engagement should 
also focus on how the shift to more sustainable 
energy systems should be organized and paid 
for. This approach could not only increase the 
chances of public support for change, it could 
also open up possibilities for compromise
6. There are significant risks to scaling back 
the UK’s low carbon ambitions, as some have 
advocated. It would prolong the UK’s reliance 
on a fossil fuel based energy system, and the 
exposure of consumers and the UK economy 
to the potential impacts of high fossil fuel 
prices. However, natural resource issues will 
also be important if the low carbon transition 
continues as planned, albeit to a lesser degree. 
Controversies and concerns about some of 
these resources – particularly shale gas and 
biomass – may limit the extent to which they 
can be developed and used. 
7. The transition to a low carbon energy 
system will have uncertain implications for 
ecosystems, both in the UK and globally. Our 
review of the evidence on ecosystem impacts of 
major power generation technologies suggests 
that low carbon technologies will have fewer 
and/or less serious impacts than fossil fuels. 
However, it also shows that the evidence base 
is weak and that significant further research is 
needed to strengthen this evidence base.
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The UK faces multiple uncertainties in pursuing its 
energy and climate change goals. In a challenging 
economic climate, UK energy futures have become 
more uncertain and contested. Contrasting 
energy priorities are being articulated in public 
policy and in the private sector, exacerbated by 
controversies over energy prices and bills, shale 
gas development, onshore wind power and new 
nuclear power stations.
Despite this contestation, the UK remains 
committed to ambitious climate change targets, 
underpinned by the Climate Change Act 2008. The 
Climate Change Act established a target for the 
UK to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at 
least 80 per cent compared to 1990 levels by 2050. 
Under the terms of the Act, four carbon ‘budgets’ 
have been agreed and legislated which provide 
a pathway for emissions reduction from 2008 
to 2027. The fourth carbon budget, covering the 
period 2023-2027, was agreed by the government 
in 2011 on the condition that it could be reviewed 
(CCC, 2013a; CCC, 2013b).
When it was passed, the Climate Change Act 
received strong cross-party support. However, more 
recent rises in energy prices, the impact of the 2008 
financial crisis and heightened concerns about 
energy security have challenged this consensus.
For decades, successive UK governments have 
emphasised three energy policy objectives 
(Pearson & Watson, 2011): security, sustainability 
and affordability. The relative importance and 
nature of these goals has changed over time, 
and they have sometimes been joined by other 
objectives such as industrial development.
While climate change has been high on the UK 
energy policy agenda for over a decade, and it 
remains centrally important, recent statements 
from government Ministers show that energy 
policy is once again in a state of flux. Energy 
Minister Michael Fallon MP provided his own view 
on the order of policy priorities in a speech in 
late 2013, which confirmed that climate change 
mitigation is subject to increasing trade-offs with 
other objectives within government.
Introduction
“ Security of supply, affordability, and playing our part in combating climate change. And that for me is the order [of priorities]”
Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, 
December 2013
The focus on affordability has been particularly 
prominent in policy and political debates due to 
steep rises in energy bills since the mid 2000s, and 
heightened by the Labour leader Ed Miliband’s 
pledge that a future Labour administration would 
implement a price freeze.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne 
MP, also concentrated on energy costs in his 
2014 budget speech, and on the technologies and 
policies that, in his view, would bring costs down:
“ We need to cut our energy costs. We’re going to do this by investing in new sources of energy: new nuclear power, renewables, and a shale gas revolution. We’re going to do this 
by promoting energy efficiency”
Rt Hon George Osborne MP, 
March 2014
The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Ed Davey MP, has also placed more 
emphasis on energy security and affordability 
recently – and has sought to integrate these 
objectives with climate change mitigation. In a 
recent speech, he argued that:
“ Our energy security is best served by minimising our exposure to the volatile global fossil fuel markets, enhancing our energy efficiency and maximising home-
grown low carbon energy, as well as cleaner 
indigenous reserves, such as natural gas, to help 
ease the low carbon transition”
Rt Hon Ed Davey MP, 
March 2014
The research has two main aims:
 
• To generate, synthesise and communicate 
evidence about the range and nature of the 
risks and uncertainties facing UK energy 
policy and the achievement of its goals 
relating to climate change, energy security and 
affordability.
• To identify strategies for mitigating risks 
and managing uncertainties for both public 
policymakers and private sector strategists.
In common with other UKERC research, this report 
takes a ‘whole systems’ approach to the analysis 
of energy uncertainties. It focuses on uncertainties 
across the entire energy system, including 
electricity, heat and transport, in an integrated 
way. It also takes an interdisciplinary perspective 
that combines insights from engineering, natural 
science and social science.
The report draws heavily on ten project working 
papers1. Each paper includes a detailed analysis 
of particular areas of uncertainty. The majority of 
them discuss the implications of their analysis for 
the CCC fourth carbon budget pathway. 
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These tensions over the goals of energy policy 
have added to a range of other uncertainties 
about whether and how the UK’s climate change 
targets can be met. Since the scientific case for a 
continuing commitment to these targets is very 
strong (CCC, 2013a; IPCC, 2014), these uncertainties 
should be analysed in detail so that policies and 
strategies can be implemented to manage or 
mitigate them.
Against this background, this report presents 
the results of an in-depth critical appraisal of 
uncertainties facing UK’s low carbon transition 
to 2030. It focuses in particular on uncertainties 
that could affect the achievability of the fourth 
carbon budget pathway that was set out by the 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC) in 2011 (CCC, 
2011), and revised in late 2013 (CCC, 2013b). It 
also pays attention to uncertainties that will be 
still be important if the UK’s carbon emissions do 
not reduce as planned due to a reduced political 
commitment to decarbonisation and/or ineffective 
policies and strategies.
The report draws on detailed research on these 
uncertainties by a large team from the UK Energy 
Research Centre (UKERC). It highlights what the 
key uncertainties are – and what could be done to 
mitigate them.
1 The ‘Energy Strategy Under Uncertainty’ project working papers which accompany this report 
are available online at: www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/Energy+Strategy+Under+Uncertainty+External
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The papers focus on:
• Methodologies: conceptual frameworks 
for analysing uncertainty; the analysis of 
uncertainty in energy systems models; and 
natural resource assessment
• Low carbon power generation: investment and 
finance; and low carbon technology assessment
• Low carbon heat: networks for low carbon heat; 
and heat demand
• Low carbon transport: the adoption of electric 
vehicles
• Ecosystem service impacts of low carbon 
resources and technologies
• Public attitudes and values in relation to 
energy system futures
The evidence from these working papers has been 
complemented by research from other UKERC 
research projects and the wider academic and 
other literature. The analysis for the project was 
conducted over the past 18 months through a 
combination of literature reviews, desk research 
and new primary data collection.
The remainder of this report comprises four 
further sections. Section 2 briefly summarises 
the CCC’s advice on the fourth carbon budget, 
including their recent revisions to that advice. 
This includes a summary of some of the energy 
system changes the Committee have argued will 
be necessary to meet the fourth budget. Section 
3 sets out the results of our analysis of the key 
uncertainties that could affect the UK’s progress 
towards meeting the fourth carbon budget. It 
includes an analysis of uncertainties for electricity 
generation, heat and transport (with a particularly 
focus on electric vehicles). It also includes a 
discussion of more systemic uncertainties that 
have the potential to have wider impacts on energy 
system change, including issues relating to natural 
resources, ecosystem service impacts and public 
attitudes. Section 4 brings this detailed analysis 
together and highlights some of the actions 
that could be taken to mitigate or manage these 
uncertainties, and by whom. Finally, section 5 sets 
out our conclusions.
2
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Under the Climate Change Act 2008 the UK is 
subject to a target of an 80 per cent reduction in 
carbon emissions by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. 
To ensure that emissions reduce on a pathway 
that is compatible with this long-term goal, four 
statutory carbon budgets have been set for the 
period from 2008 to 2027, outlining allowable 
emissions for the traded and non-traded sectors 
of the economy (see Table 1). The UK comfortably 
complied with the first budget, and is currently in 
the second carbon budget period.
2.1 The fourth carbon budget
While the period of the fourth carbon budget 
(2023-27) falls slightly short of the timeframe for 
this report (2030), the CCC’s analysis of this budget 
covers the time period to 2030. The CCC’s original 
advice, published in 2011, put forward a ‘domestic 
action’ budget of 1950MtCO2 equivalent. This was 
accepted by government and legislated for in June 
2011 (CCC, 2013b). The overall cost of the budget 
was estimated at less than 1 per cent of the GDP 
in 2030. The indicative 2030 target for total GHG 
emissions is 310MtCO2e (240MtCO2, 70Mt non-
CO2), implying a 60 per cent reduction from 1990 
levels. The main sectors covered by the budget are 
the power and industrial sectors, buildings and 
surface transport, agriculture, land-use change and 
forestry (see Figure 1).
The period to 2030 is considered particularly 
important, considering that a yearly 5 per cent 
reduction will be required from 2030 to 2050 
in order for the UK’s long term targets to be 
achieved. The CCC argues that the acceleration of 
emissions reductions in that period will only be 
achieved if the right conditions are in place and the 
appropriate technologies have developed by 2030. 
In common with UKERC analysis (Ekins et al., 
2013), the CCC argues that early power sector 
decarbonisation is crucial under any credible 
scenario to meet the UK’s climate change targets. 
The carbon intensity of electricity generation 
should fall significantly, while electricity demand 
is likely to increase due to the electrification of 
heat & transport. According to the CCC analysis, 
the average emission intensity of electricity is 
required to drop to approximately 50gCO2/kWh 
by 2030 through the addition of 30-40GW of low-
carbon generating plant during the 2020s. This 
translates into a minimum build rate of 3GW per 
year through the 2020s, which should be achieved 
through a combination of nuclear, fossil fuel plants 
with CCS and renewables. Due to the emphasis the 
CCC places on the electrification of the heat and 
transport sectors by 2050, the power sector may 
need to approximately double in size by that date, 
requiring high levels of investment in low-carbon 
capacity. The CCC notes that annual investment 
requirements through the 2020s for power 
generation would reach approximately £10bn. 
The electrification of heating for buildings and 
surface transport are significant aspects of the 
fourth carbon budget analysis. In terms of building 
emissions reduction, the CCC’s scenarios are 
largely dominated by electric heat pumps, which 
are responsible for approximately 70 per cent 
of emissions reduction potential. By contrast, 
the development of district heating is limited. 
Regarding energy efficiency the CCC argues that 
the focus to 2030 should be on measures where 
there is limited implementation to 2020, e.g. solid 
wall insulation. This, in turn, will increase the 
effectiveness of heat pump deployment. 
In terms of surface transport, the CCC analysis 
expects all new vehicles beyond 2035 to be ultra 
low-carbon, implying a high rate of adoption by 
2030. Battery electric or hybrid electric cars and 
vans are expected to become cost-effective during 
2020s by the CCC, leading to the full phase-out of 
conventional cars and vans by mid-2030s.
The UK’s Medium Term 
Climate Change Targets
Time Period Emissions (MtCO2e)
2008-2012 3018
2013-2017 2782
2018-2022 2544
2023-2027 1950
Source: DECC (2009); DECC (2011b)
Table 1. UK Carbon Budgets
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2.1.1 Revision of the fourth carbon budget
In December 2013 the CCC published a revision 
of their original fourth carbon budget advice 
to inform a possible government review of that 
budget (CCC, 2013b). This included an ‘updated 
abatement’ scenario. This most recent analysis 
uses improved forecasting methods and revised 
assumptions in many areas covered by the 
budget. This includes revisions to assumptions 
about heat pump and electric vehicle uptake, the 
effectiveness of efficiency measures in buildings 
and the development of district heating. The 
updated abatement scenario results in a lower 
fourth budget of 1690MtCO2e. This is partly due 
to decreased baseline emissions projections. It 
therefore appears that the original budget could be 
met more easily. Even so, the CCC does not suggest 
a revision to its original recommended budget. 
This is based on unresolved uncertainties in the 
updated abatement scenario and uncertainties 
relating to EU targets. Moreover, the fourth carbon 
budget review recommends the same power 
generation intensity for 2030 (50gCO2/kWh), even 
though estimated power sector emissions for 2030 
are lower than in the original assessment. Once 
again, the CCC argues that this would be achieved 
through the deployment of a portfolio of low-
carbon technologies. 
The CCC argues that due to reduced abatement 
potential, solid wall insulation is no longer seen as 
cost-effective in the revised analysis. However, the 
importance of solid wall insulation in alleviating 
fuel poverty is acknowledged. The abatement 
potential of cavity wall and loft insulation has 
also been revised downwards, but to a lesser 
extent. A significant difference is that the updated 
analysis outlines a lower uptake of heat pumps by 
2030. These are projected to be installed in 13 per 
cent of homes (4 million or 72TWh) by that date 
instead of 21 per cent (7 million or 143TWh) in 
the original analysis. This is partly due to updated 
evidence on capital costs, durability and heat 
pump performance. Conversely, the expectations 
for district heating investment have been revised 
upwards to account for 6 per cent of building heat 
instead of 2 per cent (30TWh instead of 10TWh).
The expectations for the uptake of EVs have also 
been revised. The updated analysis for surface 
transport includes a lower uptake of EVs in 2020. 
However, the uptake for 2030 remains unchanged 
at 60 per cent of new cars. While in the original 
CCC assessment it was expected that EVs would 
become cost effective during the 2020s, the fourth 
carbon budget review recognises that high costs 
are likely to remain as one of the main barriers in 
EVs uptake for some time to come. The CCC argues 
that the supply of a variety of EV models options, 
battery leasing, increased public awareness and 
improvements in charging infrastructure will help 
increase the pace and scale of EV adoption. Further 
‘cost-equivalent’ support measures, such as grants, 
may also be required. The analysis also notes that 
higher carbon prices would be required to justify 
increased battery capacities and therefore longer 
ranges. A slower uptake of EVs in 2030 would delay 
the point in which low emission vehicles make up 
100 per cent of sales to past 2035. The CCC state 
that this delay would jeopardise the achievement 
of the 2050 target.
Figure 1. The UK’s pathway to a low carbon society. Source: Adapted from CCC, 2011.
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The decarbonisation of the UK power sector by 
2030 has been shown by both CCC and UKERC 
(Ekins et al., 2013) analysis to be essential to meet 
our longer-term climate targets while minimising 
the costs of doing so. This means moving from the 
current carbon intensity of electricity of 400-500g 
of CO2 per kWh to a level closer to 50g/kWh. This 
section highlights a number of key uncertainties 
that will affect this aspiration for power sector 
decarbonisation. This sector faces a level of capital 
investment in the coming two decades far higher 
than the previous two decades. It needs to renew 
its ageing generation fleet, and shift towards 
capital-intensive low-carbon forms of generation. 
The decarbonisation of the power sector by 
2030 is subject to a range of financial, economic, 
technological, policy and political uncertainties. 
In this section of the report, our analysis focuses 
on two inter-related areas of uncertainty in 
particular, and the extent to which these can be 
mitigated or better understood (see Figure 2).
First, the section discusses the availability 
of financial capital, and the extent to which 
available capital will be directed into low carbon 
investments in the UK. Second, it focuses on 
the extent to which ‘technology uncertainties’ 
affect that availability of capital – and whether 
policy reforms that have been implemented are 
likely to make such uncertainties manageable for 
investors. These areas of uncertainty are heavily 
influenced by other, more systemic uncertainties 
that are also shown in Figure 2. In particular, 
uncertainties associated with public attitudes 
towards energy system change, and the extent 
to which decarbonisation is aligned with the 
values associated with these attitudes, are very 
significant. These uncertainties are discussed 
alongside other systemic uncertainties (resource 
availability and ecosystem service impacts) in 
sections 3.4 and 3.5 of this report.
3.1.1 Will there be enough capital?
Over the past few years, various organisations 
and commentators have suggested that the 
UK electricity sector may be unable to deliver 
sufficient investment in low carbon power 
generation. Estimates of the size of the investment 
challenge range from the widely quoted DECC/ 
Ofgem figure of £110bn for electricity generation 
and transmission by 2020 to much higher figures 
ranging from £200bn to over £300bn by 2030 
(Blyth et al., 2014a). Comparing a range of different 
published estimates on a like-for-like basis of 
average annual investment (Figure 3), the average 
amount of investment required is £6.1bn/year 
(3.4 GW per year of new capacity) to 2020. This 
increases to £12.3bn (5.7 GW) to 2030, reflecting 
the need to expand the construction of capital-
intensive low carbon plant, and to account for 
greater levels of plant retirement, post-2020.
These projected requirements are considerably 
higher than the average investment rate during the 
2000s (£1.1bn/year). This gulf led to concerns about 
the ability of the sector to deliver the impending 
investment needs. However, in the investment in 
power generation was particularly sparse, with 
only about half the level of investment of the 
1990s. More recently since 2009, investment has 
been scaling up significantly. Over the period 
2009-2012, average capacity additions were 4 GW 
per year, with average annual capital investment 
of £4.6bn. These are much closer to the estimates 
of investment needs to 2020 and 2030. In 2012 in 
particular, wind investment reached 1.9 GW, which 
compares favourably with an average requirement 
of 2GW per annum across all future scenarios 
for the studies reviewed in this report. However, 
to reach the most environmentally ambitious 
scenarios, wind investment would need to scale up 
to around 3GW per year, requiring an extra £2bn 
annually.
Appraisal of the
Fourth Carbon Budget Pathway
6. TPA 
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Recent investment rates therefore suggest 
that immediate concerns about a large ‘gap’ in 
investment may be overstated. However, major 
questions remain about whether recent rates of 
investment can be sustained through the period 
to 2020. There are signs that the reduced demand 
and other market conditions are causing the major 
utilities to scale back planned capital expenditure 
by as much as 30 per cent by 2015 relative to 2012 
levels. In the 2000s, utilities took on higher debt 
levels to fund mergers and acquisitions across 
Europe. These companies are now attempting 
to de-leverage their balance sheets in order to 
maintain reasonable credit ratings and access 
to the low-cost bonds and shares on which their 
business model depends. This constrains their 
ability to raise debt to cover increased investment. 
The role of these utilities has varied with respect 
to the main large-scale low carbon generation 
technologies. In offshore wind, consortia with 
multiple investors are usually put together to 
finance the large scale of investment required. 
Utilities usually own the majority of the equity, 
with consortia of banks holding the debt. 
The involvement of established utilities provides 
an important anchor that gives other investors 
some reassurance that projects will not be 
abandoned should they run into difficulties. 
However, current constraints on utilities mean 
that scaling up offshore wind will probably need to 
involve a greater diversity of players, with utilities 
taking a smaller share. 
By contrast, individual nuclear power investments 
are very large, with unique risk profiles. While 
agreement has only been reached on one nuclear 
station so far (at Hinkley C), equity investors 
seem most likely to be utilities or equipment 
manufacturers, or a combination of both. 
Significant guarantees (implicit or explicit) are 
also very likely to be needed from national 
governments. The fossil fuel segment of the market 
could become more diversified depending on the 
degree to which capacity markets look attractive to 
independent power producers. Utilities seem likely 
to play a continued role here too, especially for the 
large investments required for carbon capture and 
storage if that technology takes off post-2020. 
Figure 2. Key uncertainties for decarbonising the power sector to 2030 
Heat pump
effectiveness
Tech costs
too high Lack of tech 
progress
Public 
attitudes
Eco-system 
services
Bio-energy 
resources
EV 
effectiveness
Policy and 
politics
Lack of 
capital
Wrong type
of capital
Power sector 
decarbonisation
Transport and heat decarbonisation
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In general, the future role of the big pan-
European utilities in the UK depends largely on 
market conditions, including the extent to which 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR) is successful. If 
these companies do not find it attractive to invest 
in the UK due to the real or perceived risks being 
too high, it is unlikely that other companies will 
find it attractive to invest either.
3.1.2 Is investment in the UK power sector too 
risky?
Finance sector organisations interviewed for 
UKERC research tended to say there is not a lack 
of money, just a lack of good projects (Blyth et al., 
2014a). While finance is available in principle, the 
vast majority of money in financial markets is 
structurally required to be in low risk investments. 
90 per cent of funds held by the largest 
institutional investors are in bonds and shares of 
investment-grade companies.
While higher risk capital is available, volumes 
are probably too small to address the scale 
of infrastructure investment required. Some 
commentators have suggested that institutional 
investors could play an increasing role by taking a 
direct stake in investments rather than investing 
in utilities (PWC, 2010). Some involvement from 
such investors has been seen in offshore wind 
projects, but this is currently at a low level. While 
the total assets managed by these investors is 
vast (approximately $70 trillion or £40 trillion), 
it is highly segmented by region and sector, and 
the great majority of the money (90 per cent) is 
dedicated to liquid low-risk assets, such as bonds 
and shares.
Institutional investment in renewables across 
Europe was €2-€4bn (£1.7-£3.3bn) per year in 2011 
and 2012, with perhaps 10 per cent of this going to 
the UK. Our analysis suggests that the UK energy 
sector could see an increase from this source up 
to perhaps £800m per year (Blyth et al., 2014a). 
However, this depends on achieving a suitable risk 
profile for the investments. Institutional investors 
have tended to prefer assets with guaranteed 
returns. In the energy sector, these have 
mostly been in regulated assets such as energy 
distribution networks.
Another factor which may limit the role of 
institutional investors is their tendency to prefer 
low-profile investments with a low degree of 
public exposure. They may prefer to remain junior 
partners in energy projects in order to avoid the 
risk that the current political and public focus on 
the high costs of new energy sources could turn 
into increased scrutiny of them (see section 3.5 of 
this report). This scrutiny has focused on the ‘big 
six’ utilities so far, but they also need to make a 
reasonable return to justify investments in new 
plants. The problem is that there is no consensus 
about what such a ‘reasonable’ rate should be.
Figure 3. Financial resources required to decarbonise the power sector
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At present, the primary focus of government 
policies such is to get the investment conditions 
right in the electricity sector, and to try to mitigate 
investor risks. In the short-term, these policies 
could be strengthened with a greater role for 
public financial institutions such as the Green 
Investment Bank and the European Investment 
Bank to take direct stakes in projects to leverage 
other investors in and to accelerate the recycling of 
pre-construction capital into new projects. Project 
bonds may start to play a more significant role, but 
evidence is mixed regarding realistic potential.
An alternative approach would be to completely 
re-regulate electricity generation using a fixed 
rate of return model that removes most of the risk 
for the investor. The downside of this approach 
in terms of reducing competitive pressures, 
decreased incentives for innovation and the 
potential for the pass through of cost over-runs to 
consumers should not be underestimated. The new 
contracts for low carbon generation that are being 
introduced as part of EMR are a half-way house, 
providing fixed income, though not fixed returns 
because of uncertainty over construction and 
operating costs.
In the longer term, ownership structures and the 
electricity market are set to evolve. Direct stakes 
in energy projects by institutional investors are 
currently low, but could grow to a more significant 
level. Equipment manufacturers often take a stake 
in offshore wind, and could do so also for nuclear. 
The capacity mechanism being introduced under 
EMR could also attract more diverse ownership, 
and could start to engage the demand side more 
actively. Combined with the growth of embedded 
generation, this may alter the characteristics of the 
market substantially over the next two decades, 
bringing with it a diversification of financing 
models for the sector. The impending review by the 
Competition and Markets Authority could provide 
an opportunity to revisit the fundamentals of 
utility business models in the UK, and to open up 
the energy market to this wider range of investor 
possibilities.
3.1.3 Technology uncertainties: can they be 
managed?
The analysis for this report has analysed three 
categories of uncertainty relating to low carbon 
power generation technologies (Blyth et al., 2014b):
• Techno-economic uncertainties associated 
with the economic, environmental and 
technical performance of individual low carbon 
technologies;
• Programmatic uncertainties associated with 
the wider policy, regulatory and institutional 
arrangements that could affect the 
development pathways for these technologies; 
and
• System integration uncertainties arising from 
the integration of multiple power generation 
technologies within a low carbon electricity 
system.
Therefore, some of these uncertainties are specific 
to the technologies concerned, while others are 
sufficiently substantial to alter the development 
pathway of the overall electricity system. The 
analysis focuses on four specific energy supply 
technologies: solar PV, offshore wind, carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear power. Table 
2 summarises the different types of uncertainty 
that are associated with each of these options, and 
with electricity decarbonisation as a whole.
The impact of failure of any individual technology 
to reach maturity is heightened by the fact that 
there are relatively few technologies involved in 
the electricity sector transition envisaged to 2030 
under the fourth carbon budget. Many of the 
most immediate uncertainties relate directly to 
capital or operating costs, but other factors such as 
availability and reliability can also have important 
cost, environmental or security impacts. Potential 
environmental impacts include the failure of a 
low carbon technology to fulfil its expected role 
in reducing emissions. Of course, even if low 
carbon technologies are reliable, some of them will 
have impacts on the climate or other ecosystem 
services (see section 3.4 of this report). Security 
impacts could play out over a shorter timescale: 
e.g. a shortfall in generation capacity could occur 
if plant availability is lower than expected, or if 
construction takes longer than expected.
Policy assessments of technological uncertainties 
incorporate financial appraisal and energy system 
modelling, with an emphasis on costs of generation 
while investors would also be concerned with 
revenue risk. Policy-makers are often required to 
make judgements about the long-term economics 
of low carbon generation technologies in order 
to decide what level and type of public policy 
support to provide (if any). Methods used to inform 
these judgements include learning curves, and 
separate assessments for the R&D, demonstration 
and pre-commercialisation stages of technology 
development. Technology readiness assessments 
are used to judge the type of policy support they 
are likely to need. However, as a recent UKERC 
evidence review has shown (Gross et al., 2013), 
forecasting future costs is complicated. 
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Costs for several power generation technologies 
increased in the mid-2000s, a development that ran 
counter to many projections. It partially reversed 
cost reductions seen in the 1990s. This gives rise 
to a concern about whether projections of future 
cost reduction (see Figure 4) are the product of 
‘optimism bias’. UKERC’s analysis found that there 
are many reasons why costs did not evolve as 
expected. Some technologies appear more likely 
than others to benefit from ongoing ‘learning 
effects’, which drive down costs as deployment 
increases.
The report also cautions that historically 
some analyses failed to anticipate events (e.g. 
commodity price movements or macro-economic 
trends) that can undermine or overwhelm learning 
and innovation. However, the review also identified 
more rigorous ‘appraisal realism’ in several recent 
reports for the UK government, and that awareness 
of uncertainty about cost trends is improving. It 
concluded that there is substantial evidence that 
the costs of new technologies can be brought 
down through innovation and economies of scale, 
though this may take some time to occur. Costs 
can increase in the early stages of deployment due 
to ‘teething troubles’.
UK funding for technology development and 
deployment is fragmented, with funding powers 
distributed across many different public and 
private bodies. This presents strengths and 
weaknesses for tackling technical uncertainties. 
On the positive side, fragmented funding provides 
a variety of institutional approaches that can be 
tailored to the specific needs of each ‘family’ of low 
carbon technologies. On the negative side, it makes 
oversight of the innovation process more complex.
Despite efforts at coordination between the 
various innovation support bodies (e.g. through 
the Low Carbon Innovation Co-ordinating Group), 
fragmentation makes it harder to share learning 
and to identify key areas of programmatic 
uncertainty. This is exacerbated by the difficulties 
that all public sector institutions face of dealing 
with, and learning from, technology ‘failures’.  
Competition between institutions could mean a 
tendency to focus on opportunities and success, 
and a lack of attention to innovation issues that 
affect the whole electricity or energy system. The 
difficulty of openly identifying and discussing 
failure is compounded by the political need to 
show that all low carbon options are kept open. 
Techno-Economic Programme System Integration
Generic • Economic & financial 
viability
• Uncertainty over future 
costs
• Market conditions (e.g. 
future demand and fuel 
prices)
• Policy commitment and 
support
• Public acceptance
• Supply-chains for scaling-
up
• Skills & knowledge 
• Innovation co-ordination
• Achieving high levels of 
electricity system diversity
• Adapting supply-side 
options to demand-side 
flexibility and innovation
Nuclear • High capital costs & 
realising reductions
• Long-term waste 
management
• Long build times
• Long-term waste 
management 
• Regulatory risks 
associated with safety 
requirements
• Adapting to changing 
base-load profile of supply
CCS • Realising cost reductions
• Regulation of CO2 storage
• Integration of CCS 
component systems and 
skills
• Variety of technologies 
could fragment  
development efforts
• Scaling-up technology
• Realising cost reductions
• Operating CO2 transport 
& storage under variable 
generation profile
Offshore 
Wind
• Realising cost reductions 
(capital & operating costs)
• Uncertainty over domestic 
supply chain
• Integration of intermittent 
generation: need for 
storage, demand-side 
response, interconnection 
etc. 
Solar PV • Potential volatility of 
international supply chain 
costs
• Creating stable price 
support expectations
Table 2. Electricity generation technology uncertainties
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DECC stated in the original Carbon Plan that it will 
run a ‘low carbon technology race’ in the 2020s 
between the main generation technologies to see 
which of them will deliver emissions reductions 
at lowest cost (DECC, 2011b). But building up 
the necessary supply-chains and attracting 
investment to each of these technologies requires 
everyone involved to believe that the technology 
development pathways are possible and credible, 
and that real and substantial project pipelines will 
be developed in order to keep firms and investors 
engaged. In practice, this will continue to require 
significant political capital as well as financial 
capital. Contemporary controversies about 
technologies such as onshore wind and nuclear 
power suggest that the availability of both political 
and financial capital will have limits.
Technology uncertainty and failure may also be 
under-represented in energy system models. Many 
models use variations of optimisation routines 
which are built on an assumption of perfect 
foresight (i.e. they know what future costs and 
performance will be).
While the perfect foresight assumption is altered 
or diluted in some models, such methods lack the 
ability to explore adequately deeper uncertainties 
such as the potential for sudden disruptive events 
or technology paradigm shifts. Models can be 
developed to deal with more uncertainty. For 
example, the working paper by Pye et al. (2014) for 
this project has included probability distributions 
within the Energy Technologies Institute energy 
systems model to explore trade-offs in low carbon 
energy scenarios. This goes beyond the more 
usual approach of applying sensitivity analysis to 
a model: an approach that still tends to assume 
that everyone involved in a particular pathway 
or realisation of the world knows where they are 
going, and no major mistakes or disruptions occur. 
The level of contingency planning is probably 
therefore currently underestimated, and it may 
be necessary to build more slack into the system. 
To allow for failure or underperformance in any 
one or more of the currently planned technology 
pathways, it would be necessary for the others to 
expand to compensate. 
Figure 2.4: Range of LCOE estimates, in-year mean and UK-specific forecasts 
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These observations highlight the difficulties facing policy 
makers where there is both a considerable degree of 
uncertainty over technology costs at the time that those 
estimates were made (represented by the wide ranges 
associated with each estimate), and uncertainty over how 
those costs will change over time (represented by the 
differences between the 2006 and 2011 estimates shown 
above). We return to this theme of uncertainty in Chapter 5.
2.4.2 The range of cost estimates past and future
As part of the technology case studies which are described 
in detail in Chapter 4, the project team collected cost 
estimate data which are used in Figure 2.4 below to plot 
the in-year mean of European estimates of contemporary 
LCOE from 1995 through to 2011, as well as the range of 
UK-specific LCOE forecasts from 2013 through to 2030 for 
four major electricity generation technologies. In addition, 
Figure 2.5 summarises the trajectory of contemporary 
capex estimates from the year 2000 onwards and 
presents the in-year mean capex value for each of the six 
technologies covered by the case studies.
Figure 2.4 shows that there is considerable variation 
in LCOE estimates over time for all the analysed 
technologies, and contrasts the direction of past variation 
over time with future forecasts. The clear trend for historic 
estimates for all of the technologies shown is one of rising 
costs from the early to mid-2000s onwards, with offshore 
wind and nuclear power apparently on significantly 
steeper upward trajectories than onshore wind and 
CCGT. Turning to forecasts, estimates for offshore wind 
in particular suggest a relatively steep reduction in costs 
over the next 10-15 years, followed by a levelling off, 
albeit still at a point higher than the lowest of the historic 
estimates. Forecasts for onshore wind and nuclear suggest 
that relatively smaller cost reductions are anticipated for 
these technologies. Forecasts for CCGT costs do not follow 
the same trajectory, although this may in part be linked 
to assumptions over future fuel prices and CO2 emissions 
costs rather than the underlying technology cost. We 
return to these issues in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
In general, forecasts tend to show a much smoother and 
more consistent, often downward trajectory, although 
there is still a considerable range of estimates within 
specific future years. Of course, estimates made in the 
past would inevitably be expected to change from one 
year to the next as technology costs responded to real 
techno-economic conditions, and we discuss the reasons 
why estimates of costs out into the future are often 
expected to fall in Chapter 3.
1995 2000 20102005 20202015 20302025
Presenting the Future: An assessment of future costs estimation methodologies 
in the electricity generation sector
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Figure 4. Range of Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE) estimates, in-year mean and UK-specific forecasts
Source: UKERC analysis
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3.2 Heat decarbonisation 
Heat constitutes the single biggest use of energy in 
the UK (Chaudry et al., 2014). Almost half 
(46 per cent) of UK final energy consumption is 
used to provide heat. Of this heat, around 75 per 
cent is used by households and in commercial 
and public buildings. The rest is used in industrial 
processes. Household heating demand is primarily 
met using gas-fired boilers connected to the 
natural gas network (81 per cent). The remainder 
is provided from electricity (7 per cent), heating 
oil (9 per cent) and from solid fuels such as wood 
and coal (3 per cent). Use of these other fuels is 
particularly significant in rural areas where there 
is no mains gas network (DECC, 2013). Meeting the 
80 per cent emissions reduction target for 2050 is 
likely to require that heat related emissions of CO2 
from buildings are near to zero by 2050, and that 
there is a 70 per cent reduction in emissions from 
industry from 1990 levels (Chaudry et al., 2014).
This section draws on two related pieces of 
research that focuses on uncertainties relating 
to low carbon heat. First, an investigation of the 
implications of heat decarbonisation for energy 
network infrastructures was carried out 
(Chaudry et al., 2014). This focused on gas, 
electricity and heat networks. Second, more 
detailed research was conducted on options for 
reducing carbon emissions from household heating 
– and the extent to which different pathways for 
low carbon heat could be compatible with the 
CCC’s fourth carbon budget pathway 
(Eyre & Baruah, 2014). 
The main uncertainties that were identified for low 
carbon heat are summarised in figure 5 together 
with uncertainties for low carbon transport.
As noted earlier in this report, the CCC’s revised 
fourth carbon budget pathway includes a range 
of actions to reduce emissions from heat – with 
a particular emphasis on energy efficiency 
improvements and the deployment of heat pumps. 
When compared to the CCC’s original fourth 
carbon budget analysis, the level of ambition for 
heat pumps has been scaled back and the delivery 
of low carbon heat via district heating networks 
has been expanded. These adjustments partly 
reflect uncertainties about the current and future 
performance of heat pumps, and how quickly 
households and businesses will adopt them.
They also reflect deeper uncertainties about 
the combinations of network infrastructures, 
low carbon technologies and energy efficiency 
measures that will be required to meet statutory 
targets.
Until recently, many analyses undertaken by the 
CCC and the UK government tended to emphasise 
that the primary route to reducing emissions from 
domestic and commercial space and water heating 
would be to use low carbon electricity, with a large 
role for electric heat pumps. However in more 
recent assessments, this view has increasingly 
been questioned. The more diverse approach in the 
CCC’s revised fourth carbon budget analysis is also 
reflected in the government’s heat strategy
(DECC, 2013). These uncertainties for low carbon 
heat can be illustrated for the household sector. 
UKERC Research Report
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Figures 6-8 shows a set of four scenarios for 
domestic heating in the UK between now and 
2050. The ‘minimum policy intervention’ scenario 
is not compatible with the UK’s climate targets. 
The other three scenarios include significant 
emissions reductions. A key contrast for this report 
is between the ‘electrification of heat’ and ‘deep 
balanced transition’ scenarios. The ‘electrification 
of heat’ scenario shows how electricity demand 
could rise significantly if electric heating systems – 
particularly heat pumps – are installed throughout 
the UK. By contrast, the ‘deep balanced transition’ 
scenario shows a future where the emphasis is on 
demand reduction and heat networks, with a much 
smaller role for electricity in the delivery of low 
carbon heat.
This analysis shows that the main challenge 
for low carbon heat during the period to 2030 
is to start a shift away from the current system 
of heating which is dominated by natural 
gas. This is perhaps more important than the 
electrification of heat per se, given that there are 
other complementary routes to low carbon heating 
that would be compatible with the fourth carbon 
budget pathway. This means that failing to reach 
the CCC’s target for electricity decarbonisation 
by 2030 (i.e. a carbon intensity around 50g/kWh) 
would not necessarily have a significant impact on 
progress with heat decarbonisation by that date.
However, even in scenarios where electrification 
is less significant, there is still a role for electric 
heating using low carbon technologies such as 
heat pumps. This means that the performance of 
heat pumps, and the rate at which households and 
businesses adopt them, should continue to receive 
a significant amount of attention.
The CCC’s revised pathway includes heat pump 
deployment of 72TWh and 10 TWh in the 
domestic/commercial and industrial sectors 
respectively. For the domestic and commercial 
sectors, this represents a 50 per cent reduction 
on the level included in the original fourth 
carbon budget analysis. The main reasons for this 
downward revision are higher investment costs 
and poorer performance than originally expected 
(Chaudry et al., 2014).
There are also other significant uncertainties that 
will affect adoption rates, including the extent to 
which space is available for installation, consumer 
attitudes to noise from air source heat pumps, 
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and the relatively high heating requirements 
of many UK households due to poor levels of 
insulation. There are also potentially significant 
implications for the electricity network if adoption 
is widespread because annual and peak electricity 
demand would increase significantly. Peaks may be 
a particular challenge. While short-term storage 
of heat within buildings can help to mitigate this 
to some extent, the widespread deployment of 
heat pumps in the ‘electrification of heat’ scenario 
shown in Figure 6 could mean an additional 
electricity system winter peak load of 40GW.
The amount of heat that will need to be provided 
by heat pumps and other technologies will be 
heavily dependent on progress with energy 
efficiency. The CCC, the government and UKERC’s 
own energy system scenarios (Ekins et al., 2013) 
have consistently emphasized the importance of 
energy efficiency and demand reduction measures. 
In the context of low carbon heat to 2030, our 
analysis shows that significant energy efficiency 
progress will also buy time. It will provide space 
for the diversity of potential technologies and 
infrastructures that could deliver low carbon heat 
to consumers to be developed, demonstrated and 
evaluated. Improved building fabric efficiency also 
aids the technical performance of heat pumps. 
However, at very high efficiencies (e.g. Passive 
House standards), space heating loads are very low 
and it potentially becomes difficult to justify the 
cost of more sophisticated heating systems. 
From 2004-2012, the long term trend of rising 
household energy demand in the UK reversed with 
large, policy driven programmes of loft and cavity 
wall insulation and condensing boilers outpacing 
rising service demands. However, this could be 
seen as an atypical period characterised by the 
easy availability of energy efficiency improvements 
and an effective policy framework to deliver them. 
This trend is now likely to change due to the lower 
availability of low cost measure and the recent 
large reductions in UK residential energy efficiency 
programmes (Rosenow & Eyre, 2013). 
An important uncertainty for heat decarbonisation 
(and indeed for reducing emissions across the 
energy system) is the extent to which energy 
efficiency incentives will be strong enough. At 
some point, however, improvements in the building 
fabric and/or ventilation will become more 
expensive than switching to low carbon forms of 
heat. UKERC’s research on household renovations 
and energy efficiency shows that the marginal 
cost of high performance refurbishment is 
surprisingly uncertain, partly because of the issue 
UKERC research at the University of East Anglia 
has highlighted (Wilson & Chryssochoidis, 2013) – 
that the costs are much lower, and projects much 
more likely to happen, if integrated into broader 
refurbishment planning.
This analysis also shows that there is a need for 
further demonstration and early deployment 
of low carbon heat technologies and associated 
infrastructures to determine which solutions 
work best in which contexts. While technologies 
such as district heating and heat pumps are not 
particularly novel, their levels of deployment are 
relatively low in the UK. Demonstration and testing 
is therefore an opportunity to develop financial 
models, explore regulatory changes that may be 
necessary (for example, heat networks are not 
subject to economic regulation), and to engage 
householders, businesses and other organisations. 
Initiatives such as the ETI’s smart systems and 
heat programme are therefore welcome.
Heat networks will only be useful in the long-
term if heat is produced from low carbon energy 
sources. Natural gas fired district heating can 
only reduce emissions so far – and is unlikely 
to help reduce emissions once electricity grid 
carbon intensity falls below 250 g/kWh. As the 
scenarios in Figures 6-8 show, district heating 
(or indeed for smaller heat systems) can be 
flexible, and can use bioenergy or biogas instead 
of natural gas. However, as discussed in section 
3.4 of this report, there are potentially competing 
demands for bioenergy resources – or the land 
that would be used to grow them – which could 
also be potentially used for power generation and 
transport. There are also significant sustainability 
concerns about the use of bioenergy (Slade et al., 
2010).
The main challenges for district heating 
implementation in the UK are non-technical. 
Barriers to implementation include constraints 
on the availability of finance available to Local 
Authorities who have a key role to play in 
developing district heating schemes. The up-front 
costs of these schemes can be substantial, and 
there is also a lack of relevant skills and knowledge 
within many Authorities. Furthermore, there may 
be issues of public acceptance, especially in cases 
where a switch from conventional individual 
heating systems is envisaged. 
Overall, low carbon heating technologies and 
their associated infrastructures can be thought 
of a complementary rather than competitive. For 
example, district heating could enable larger and 
more efficient heat pumps in future. 
20
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Figure 7. Gas demand in UK residential heating scenarios
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Figure 8. Bio-energy demand in UK residential heating scenarios
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Figure 6. Electricity demand in UK residential heating scenarios
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A combination of heat pumps and district heating 
could be beneficial for electricity load profiles and 
there is also potential for other solutions such as 
improved electrical storage heaters or hybrid heat 
pumps. By using gas to meet peak heating loads, 
these do not require the same amount of power 
capacity or grid infrastructure expansion. Ground 
source heat pumps have higher efficiencies, but air 
source heat pumps are likely to be more suitable in 
suburban locations that are space constrained. The 
use of bioenergy for heating might be unsuitable 
in dense urban environments, whereas bioenergy 
supplied as biogas or via district heating might 
be acceptable. A large number of uncertainties 
clearly remain to be resolved, but it is clear that 
natural gas dependence will need to be reduced, 
and that a range options to replace gas need to be 
demonstrated, evaluated and deployed.
3.3 Transport decarbonisation
As with heating, there are a number of routes 
for decarbonisation of surface transport. In our 
analysis, we have focused in particular on private 
road transport and the potential for Electric 
Vehicles2 (EVs). This was partly driven by the 
importance of EV roll out in the Committee on 
Climate Change’s analysis of required emissions 
reductions to 2030, and reflects the greater policy 
and industry emphasis on EVs in comparison 
to other low carbon options such as biofuels 
and hydrogen vehicles. However, it is important 
to recognize that these other options also have 
significant potential – and are being actively 
supported to some extent by current UK policies.
Emissions in the transport sector are motivated 
by a complex array of factors inclusive of, but 
not limited to, the spatial distribution of the 
built environment, working practices, population 
demographics and habits of consumption 
(Banister & Anable, 2009). With these points 
in mind, it is important to recognise that 
technological innovations such as EVs are 
likely only to offer a partial, though potentially 
significant, contribution towards the 
decarbonisation of surface transport. Moreover, 
enthusiasm towards EVs should perhaps be 
tempered by the previous occurrence of ‘hype 
cycles’ in this sector (Budde et al., 2013), most 
clearly seen in the expanding and subsequently 
contracting interest in hydrogen and biofuel 
vehicles during the past decade or so. 
The revised fourth carbon budget analysis has 
reduced the level of ambition for EV adoption by 
2020. It maintains the target for 2030 that 60 per 
cent of new car and van sales should be EVs, but 
reduces the proportion for 2020 from 16 per cent 
to 9 per cent of new sales (CCC, 2013b).  There 
were only 1742 new registrations of EVs in 2012, 
which accounted for 0.08 per cent of total new 
car registrations (DfT, 2013). In order to reach the 
sales requirements estimated by the Committee 
of Climate Change, registration rates of EVs will 
have to double every year to 2020. To provide some 
context for the scale of this challenge, the average 
annual growth in registrations of Hybrid Electric 
Vehicles in the UK between 2005 and 2012 was 
17.5 per cent.
Our research on EVs identified a range of factors 
and uncertainties that influence the rate of 
EV adoption, and assessed the extent to which 
current policies and strategies are mitigating 
these uncertainties effectively. The evidence is 
based on a series of expert interviews, including 
with some early adopters of EVs. Figure 9 provides 
an illustration of the areas of uncertainty that 
were identified. These areas include uncertainties 
associated with the drivers of consumer decision-
making, including the infrastructure, technological 
and policy uncertainties that impact directly on 
this process.
To some extent, policies have already been put in 
place to mitigate some of these uncertainties, such 
as the installation of EV charge points under the 
Plugged-in Places initiative to reduce infrastructure 
uncertainties. In addition, the significant 
commitment of government funding to support the 
development of the EV market has reduced policy 
uncertainty. In addition to these uncertainties, 
broader economic and societal uncertainties 
were identified such as the legitimacy of EVs as a 
desirable option for consumers, and developments 
in national and international economic conditions 
and fossil fuel prices.
2 Inclusive of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and pure battery electric vehicles
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These are less amenable to mitigation through 
government policy – and are related to the 
systemic uncertainties that are discussed in later 
sections of this report (see sections 3.4 and 3.5). 
This analysis identified three areas of uncertainty 
that are particularly significant, and that can be 
reduced to some extent by additional policies and 
strategies (Morton et al., 2014). First, while there is 
generous financial support for the adoption of EVs 
(in the form of upfront grants), there is significant 
uncertainty about other forms of support such as 
the length of the moratorium on fuel duty for EVs 
and the lower rates of registration and road tax 
that are currently applied. Longer term certainty 
over these taxes would make it more likely that 
some consumers would adopt EVs – and would 
improve their overall life cycle economics. Related 
to this, our research revealed concern about the 
durability of policy commitments to EVs. Second, 
the lack of an integrated payment mechanism for 
EV charging is creating significant inconvenience 
and confusion for EV users – a situation that could 
be alleviated by greater standardisation. Third, 
there is a need for more robust methodologies for 
the estimation of the environmental performance, 
costs and range limitations of EVs to provide the 
industry, government and consumers with greater 
confidence.
While these specific conclusions for the 
deployment of EVs may help to reduce some of 
the uncertainties we have identified, it is too early 
to close down the range of low carbon options 
for low carbon surface transport. While there 
has undoubtedly been significant technological, 
commercial and market progress for EVs in the 
last few years, it remains unclear whether this 
particular low carbon vehicle technology will be 
widely adopted. Other options such as hydrogen or 
more advanced and sustainable biofuels are still 
the subject of significant activity by government 
and industry, and could also achieve the 
breakthroughs required to reduce emissions.
3.4 Systemic uncertainties: natural resources and 
ecosystem services
This section discusses more systemic uncertainties 
that can have impacts across the whole energy 
system. Two areas of uncertainty are discussed 
in this section. First, it focuses on uncertainties 
associated with natural resource availability, 
including a focus on biomass and materials (more 
relevant to the low carbon pathway) and fossil 
fuels (more relevant to alternate pathway where 
low carbon ambitions are scaled back – but still 
a strong feature of the CCC low carbon pathway). 
Second, the section discusses potential impacts of 
energy system change on ecosystem services.
3.4.1 Natural resource impacts
There are significant differences in the availability 
of the natural resources used in the energy 
system. Some resources are finite (e.g. fossil fuels), 
some are renewable (e.g. biomass), and some 
are finite but potentially recyclable (e.g. critical 
metals). While availability estimates are often 
highly uncertain and contested, they can strongly 
influence the evolution of energy policies. This 
section focuses in particular on biomass and fossil 
fuels (using the example of shale gas) because 
these are particularly relevant to the fourth carbon 
budget pathway, and to contemporary energy 
policy debates. Critical metals are also of interest 
to these debates due to their anticipated use in a 
number of low-carbon technologies. At the time 
of writing a synthesis of UKERC’s recent research 
review of critical metals resources is still under 
development3. 
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Figure 9. Multiple influences on electric vehicle 
adoption 
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3 This will be published later in 2014. In the meantime, UKERC has created a ‘handbook’ that deals with the principal metals (http://
www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/Materials+Availability+Handbook).
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The section therefore draws on recent UKERC 
research that has reviewed of the range of 
estimates for biomass and shale gas resources 
(Slade et al., 2011; McGlade et al., 2013a; McGlade et 
al., 2013b). It also reflects on some methodological 
complexities that are common to the assessment 
of these different resources (Speirs et al., 2014). 
A key source of uncertainty regarding fossil fuels 
is the lack of a universally agreed definition of the 
terms used to describe their availability. In some 
cases terms such as ‘reserves’ and ‘economically 
producible volumes’ are used interchangeably, 
while other studies subdivide the ‘reserves’ of a 
commodity depending on the uncertainty in its 
recoverability. Furthermore fossil fuels may also 
be classified according to the properties of the 
commodity produced, or the technologies used to 
produce it (e.g. ‘conventional’ or ‘unconventional’ 
oil) (Speirs et al., 2014). There is no agreed definition 
of these terms, which can cause confusion 
resulting from: 1) equating inconsistent terms; 2) 
equating terms that contain differing assumptions; 
or 3) the use of identical sounding terminology 
when authors are in fact referring to different 
things.
Uncertainties with respect to fossil fuel availability 
may be illustrated using shale gas as an example. 
Shale gas resources are mainly affected by three 
overarching types of uncertainty (McGlade et al., 
2013a; McGlade et al., 2013b):
a. Definitional uncertainty, as described above
b. Data availability: the absence of any significant 
drilling experience for many regions of the 
world means that current resource estimates 
are not necessarily well founded. For some 
regions there may only be one estimate, while 
for some countries no contemporary estimates 
exist.
c. Methodological uncertainty: shale gas 
resources tend to be estimated either by a 
bottom up analysis of geological parameters 
or through the extrapolation of historical 
production experience. However both of these 
methodologies are sensitive to parameters that 
are poorly understood and contested in regards 
to shale gas, such as the recovery factor in the 
former approach and the production decline 
curve in the latter.
In addition to increased physical, technical and 
economic uncertainties, shale gas is subject to 
sustainability concerns (e.g. water availability) 
and socio-political uncertainties (e.g. impacts 
on landscape and property values). As recent UK 
controversies have shown, these concerns can 
render policy making problematic.
The result of these uncertainties is evident in the 
range of available shale gas estimates that were 
reviewed in 2012 by the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre (Pearson et al., 2012). A 
review of ten available estimates of global shale 
gas resources revealed a range from 7 trillion 
Figure 10. Estimates of global recoverable resources of shale gas by sources considering regions outside 
North America. Source: Adapted from Pearson et al., 2012.
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cubic meters (Tcm) to 206 Tcm, with a mean 
of 100 Tcm (Figure 10). These studies differ for 
a range of reasons including the inclusion of 
different geographical areas, differing assumptions 
regarding recovery factors, and differing definitions 
of recoverable resources.  
Bioenergy is a renewable energy resource that 
has a significant potential to substitute for oil 
and other fossil fuels, but is subject to high 
uncertainty over its future availability. While the 
physical, technical and economic uncertainties 
are not well understood, biomass reserve and 
resource estimates are particularly sensitive to 
sustainability and socio-political uncertainties. 
The interlinkages between biomass and food 
production have resulted in a debate about 
whether large-scale adoption of bioenergy can 
be truly sustainable and the extent to which 
policy support can be justified (Slade et al., 2011). 
In addition to food production and biodiversity 
concerns, conflicts can arise with established 
uses of natural resources, e.g. the pulp and 
paper and fibre board industries. If an increase 
in future biomass demand leads to higher prices, 
future biomass reserve estimates are likely to 
increase. This can be potentially problematic for 
policymakers, who will have to deal with wide 
ranges of biomass reserve and resource estimates 
in the short to medium term (Speirs et al., 2014).
In order to try to improve the evidence base for 
policymaking and examine the reasons for the 
range of estimates, UKERC undertook a systematic 
review of the literature related to biomass 
availability (Slade et al.. 2011; Slade et al., 2014). The 
review focused on the most influential estimates 
of biomass potential published since 1990. It found 
that the range of estimates is primarily driven 
by the choice of assumptions and that estimates 
should be viewed as ‘what if’ scenarios rather than 
forecasts or predictions (Slade et al., 2014). The 
reason for this is that biomass resources cannot 
be measured directly and must be estimated, 
which may be done using several different types 
of models. While these can vary in complexity and 
sophistication, the review found that assumptions 
have a larger impact than methodological 
differences. The most controversial and influential 
assumptions relate to the future role of energy 
crops. The review examines these assumptions, 
focusing on yield predictions, water availability and 
sustainability assurance. In turn these depend on 
factors such as global population growth, dietary 
habits, the potential for crop yield increases, water 
availability, land allocation for nature conservation, 
soil degradation and the potential impacts of 
climate change on land productivity (IIASA, 2012; 
Lynd et al., 2011). An overview of the impact of 
these factors on biomass availability is provided in 
Figure 11. 
Figure 11. Essential preconditions for increasing levels of biomass production. 
Source: Adapted from Slade et al., 2011.
Global biomass 
potential (EJ)
Future primary 
energy demand 
range
Global primary 
energy supply 
(2008)
Global biomass 
supply (2008)
1200
0
100
800
900
1000
1100
200
300
400
500
600
700
High 
band
Upper-
mid
Lower- 
mid
Low
• Crop yields outpace demand: >2.5Gha land for energy crops (includes >1.3Gha 
good agricultural land)
• High or very high input farming, limited and landless, animal production with 
dung recovery
• Low population (<9bn)
• Vegetarian diet OR extensive deforestation/conversion to managed forestry
• All residuesa (<100EJ constrained user, not included in all studies)
• Crop yields outpace demand: >1.5Gha land for energy crops (includes >1Gha 
good agricultural land)
• Low population OR vegetarian diet OR extensive deforestation/conversion to 
managed forestry
• All residuesa (<100EJ constrained user, not included in all studies)
• Crop yields keep pace with demand: <0.5Gha land for energy crops (mostly non-
agricultural)
• Low population OR vegetarian diet OR limited deforestation
• All residuesa (<100EJ constrained user, not included in all studies)
• Little or no land for energy crops (<0.4Gha total)
• High meat diet OR low input agriculture
• Limited expansion of cropland area AND high level of environmental protection
• Agricultural residuesa (<30EJ constrained user, not included in all studies)
a Agricultural residues, forestry residues, wastes (dung, MSW, industrial)
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In each band the minimum essential assumptions 
that must be included in global biomass models 
to achieve the given range of biomass potential 
are indicated. ‘All residues’ includes: wastes (dung, 
municipal and industrial), agricultural residues 
and forestry residues. Indicated global net primary 
productivity is aboveground terrestrial productivity 
only.
UKERC’s review cautions that the literature 
provides limited information on what might be 
achieved in practice. This point is also highlighted 
by the Intergovernmental panel on climate change 
(IPCC) 2011 Special Report, which concludes that 
the technical potential of biomass depends on 
“factors that are inherently uncertain” and cannot 
be determined precisely while societal preferences 
are unclear.
3.4.2 Ecosystem service impacts
The analysis of potential ecosystem service 
impacts for this report (Dockerty et al., 2014) 
focused on the entire life cycle, including upstream 
infrastructure, the fuel cycle (e.g. mining, 
processing), operation (e.g. power generation) and 
downstream activities (e.g. decommissioning).
It included local (UK) and international impacts on 
a range of ecosystem services, split into four main 
categories (Haines-Young & Potschin, 2013):
• Supporting services (e.g. nutrient cycling, 
photosynthesis)
• Provisioning services (e.g. water, energy, food)
• Regulation services (e.g. pollution, climate 
control)
• Maintenance and cultural services                 
(e.g. recreation)
The review of the evidence concentrated on 
supply side options including power generation 
technologies (nuclear power, carbon capture and 
storage, onshore wind and offshore wind) and 
natural resources (gas and biomass). The biomass 
assessment focused on domestically produced 
Miscanthus and short rotation coppice. These 
options were chosen since they feature strongly 
in the CCC’s fourth Carbon budget analysis to 
2030 – particularly in the CCC’s four scenarios 
for reducing power sector emissions intensity to 
50gCO2/kWh by that date. The review included 
both systematic reviews of published studies 
focusing on local impacts within the UK and expert 
judgements regarding the global impacts of UK 
power generation.
The review shows that the evidence base is 
patchy and weak. Studies tend to be ‘clustered’ 
into relatively small areas of energy life cycles 
or related to relatively few ecosystem service 
indicators. This meant that expert judgements 
were often required to interpret and synthesise this 
data, especially with respect to global impacts. The 
relatively small number of studies identified may 
be due to limitations in the approach, reflect terms 
employed in database searches, or be indicative of 
a real lack of data. It is important to note that no 
sensitivity analysis was applied to the results.
The individual impacts identified for different 
energy options from different studies can’t 
necessarily be compared directly. Including 
differential weighting or valuation of impacts to 
try to make them more comparable would have 
been extremely challenging and time consuming, 
and may not have been feasible anyway given the 
currently immature state of knowledge regarding 
impacts on many ecosystem services. The global 
and local (UK) impacts of these options are 
summarised in Figures 12 and 13. 
Overall, none of the impacts or uncertainties 
regarding ecosystem services identified by the 
review are likely to be sufficiently negative to rule 
out the combinations of energy supply options 
included within the CCC’s fourth carbon budget 
pathway. More importantly, these options are 
likely to result in fewer negative impacts on 
ecosystem services and natural capital than the 
current reliance on fossil fuels. The available 
evidence suggests that a pathway that includes 
unconventional gas produced by fracking may 
have some negative impacts. It also shows that 
these impacts are much more uncertain than the 
potential impacts from conventional natural gas 
production.
The review found that the negative impacts on 
supporting, provisioning and regulating ecosystem 
services were mostly associated with the fuel 
cycle and operational stages of the energy options 
concerned. The main beneficial impacts relate to 
offshore wind and biomass through supporting 
ecosystem functions and atmospheric regulation. 
Biomass also has some positive impacts on soil 
and biodiversity when compared to conventional 
agricultural land uses. The largely conflicting or 
negative scores for cultural ecosystem indicators 
relate mostly to upstream and downstream stages 
of the energy systems – i.e. are associated with the 
built infrastructure. Information on downstream 
impacts for renewable energy sources was scant, 
perhaps because these technologies have only 
become widely deployed in recent years.
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3.6 Systemic uncertainties: the role of public 
attitudes
One of the most important systemic uncertainties 
that will affect the achievement of the fourth 
carbon budget pathway is whether the political 
conditions will remain in place for electricity 
decarbonisation (and the wider energy sector 
emissions reductions) to take place. As this 
report has already noted, the increasing amount 
of controversy surrounding the direction of 
energy policy has increased the level of political 
uncertainty in the UK.
Understanding and engaging with public attitudes 
will be crucial in order to achieve a coalition 
for change between government, industry and 
publics (Butler et al., 2014). In doing so, it will be 
important to go beyond simplistic discussions of 
‘public acceptance’ of particular energy options 
– and to engage publics with the choices involved 
in low carbon policies and strategies. UKERC’s 
recent in-depth research on public attitudes to 
energy system change led by the Cardiff University 
suggests that publics are concerned with a wider 
range of issues than expert debates suggest 
(Parkhill et al., 2013). This research identified six 
groups of values that underpin public preferences. 
Note that these are not necessarily held by any 
one individual or by all publics, but they represent 
common ‘cultural resources’ upon which public 
preferences are formed.
They are:
• Efficiency and not wasting: being more efficient 
in the use of energy and minimising waste;
• Protection of environment and nature: being 
environmentally conscious and respectful of 
nature;
• Security and stability: making sure energy 
systems are safe, reliable. This applies to 
personal affordability and national availability 
of energy;
• Autonomy and power: being mindful of the 
autonomy and freedom at national and 
personal levels;
• Social justice & fairness: developing energy 
systems that are open, transparent and fair, 
and take into account people’s ability to lead 
healthy lives; and 
• Improvement and quality: a long-term 
trajectory for energy systems that improve 
quality of life.
As these values suggest, UKERC research has 
found that publics are interested in how energy 
transitions should be organised and paid for, not 
just in what technologies might be deployed. 
While energy policy framings such as those in the 
CCC’s fourth carbon budget report reflect some 
of these values, they do not engage with the full 
range of public concerns (Butler et al., 2014). This is 
particularly apparent in three areas. First, values 
of social justice and fairness and autonomy and 
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Figure 12. Global ecosystem service impacts of 
selected energy supply options
Figure 13. Local ecosystem service impacts of 
selected energy supply options
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power focus specifically on the equity implications 
of energy systems (particularly fuel poverty) and 
the wider market arrangements that govern the 
energy system. While the CCC has considered the 
impacts of the fourth carbon budget pathway on 
fuel poverty, the number of fuel poor households 
has continued to rise in recent years (Fuel Poverty 
Advisory Group, 2013). Furthermore, wider policy 
discourses have been reluctant to question 
the structure of the energy market. Although 
the recent announcement of a review by the 
Competition and Markets Authority is a step in 
this direction, it is unlikely to ask some of the 
fundamental questions within public framings.
Second, policy framings relating to values of 
protection of the environment and nature – 
including those in the CCC fourth carbon budget 
– focus primarily on carbon emissions. While this 
is in line with public concerns, it does not tend 
to include wider concerns about the impact of 
current and future energy systems on the natural 
environment, such as other forms of pollution 
associated with fossil fuels and their extraction. 
As discussed earlier in this report (section 3.4), the 
impacts of low carbon technologies and renewable 
resources on ecosystem services are very uncertain 
due to a lack of good empirical evidence. 
Third, although the CCC and the government 
place a significant emphasis on energy security, 
this does not necessarily align with public values 
of security and stability. Policy discourses tend to 
focus on national energy security, while publics 
see security from a more local and personal 
perspective. This local framing is often linked 
to their ability to access and afford energy (and 
the services it provides). As recent controversies 
confirm, publics do not regard energy as affordable 
at present. UKERC research also shows that relative 
affordability and price stability (as opposed to 
universally low prices) is important.
Turning to the specific technical options set out 
by the CCC to meet the fourth carbon budget, 
many of these align with public values – including 
measures to reduce energy demand, to increase 
the use of renewable energy, and to move away 
from fossil fuels. Support for nuclear power is 
more conditional, and is likely to only extend to 
replacement rather than expansion.
There are, however, some options that are viewed 
by publics as ‘non transitions’ in the CCC and 
government plans (Butler et al., 2013) options 
that were found to be seen as problematic 
because they do not fit with values associated 
with environmental protection and long-
term improvement and quality. These include 
carbon capture and storage (since it enables the 
continuing use of fossil fuels) and bioenergy 
(because of concerns about their sustainability). 
To summarise, the technocratic emphasis of the 
CCC analysis (and indeed of much government 
policy analysis) misses out some issues that are 
central to public framings, and therefore fail to 
properly account for additional layers of political 
uncertainty associated with such public views. 
This includes the way in which energy system 
change should be organised and paid for, how 
equity concerns should be addressed, and what 
the balance of responsibility for change should be 
between the public and private sectors and civil 
society.
4
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Having set out some of the key uncertainties 
for the implementation of the UK’s low carbon 
transition, it is important to ask what could 
be done to reduce or manage them. Table 3 
summarises the uncertainties that have been 
identified in the report, their complexity and 
potential impact, and further actions that 
could be taken to mitigate them. In the Table, a 
distinction has been made between more bounded 
‘instrumental’ uncertainties that related to specific 
technologies or parts of the energy system and 
broader ‘systemic’ uncertainties that could have an 
impact on the overall direction of energy system 
development.
The assessments summarised in the table are 
designed to provide rough ‘high level’ guide to 
the extent and importance of the uncertainties 
concerned. The second column of the table draws 
on methodological research for this project 
(Davies et al., 2014). This identifies different levels 
of complexity for decision-making in uncertain 
contexts. If complexity is low, the number of 
variables – and the range of uncertainty with 
respect to those variables – is bounded and well 
known. By contrast, high levels of complexity 
implies that there are multiple variables, some of 
which are difficult to characterise because the full 
range of potential outcomes are not well known. 
The third column suggests how large an impact 
each uncertainty could have on the achievement of 
the fourth carbon budget pathway if action is not 
taken to mitigate it.
The fourth column of the table summarises some 
actions that could be taken to partly or fully 
resolve the uncertainty, or to inform better decision 
making if significant uncertainty is likely to 
remain over the period to 2030. These actions are 
discussed further in the conclusions to this report 
(see section 5). Finally, the fifth column suggests 
which actors could take primary responsibility 
for acting to mitigate or better understand the 
uncertainty concerned. Within this column, the 
generic term ‘citizens’ has been used to denote 
the involvement of individuals or communities, 
either as consumers or in broader roles. Similarly, 
the term ‘businesses’ has been used to include a 
range of different types of business – from large-
scale utilities to small firms involved in the energy 
efficiency supply chain. Roles for government are 
also suggested at a number of levels – including 
national, devolved and local government within 
the UK, and foreign governments in cases where 
international policy processes are likely to be 
important. 
 
The analysis summarised in the Table highlights 
three main sets of issues. First, there are 
significantly higher levels of ‘instrumental 
uncertainty’ about pathways to reduce emissions 
from the heat and transport sectors than there are 
about the decarbonisation of the electricity sector. 
This has advantages as well as disadvantages. For 
heat and transport, there is still time for options 
to be kept open and for testing, demonstration 
and evaluation of different technologies and 
infrastructures. For electricity, a limited set of 
low carbon technologies could play a significant 
role in a low carbon electricity system in 2030. 
In the longer term, other technologies may 
become important. But in the period to 2030, the 
main instrumental uncertainties relate to the 
demonstration, financing and deployment of that 
limited set of technologies. Of course, the wider 
systemic uncertainties highlighted in this report 
will also have a significant impact on the mix of 
technologies within a low carbon electricity system 
– and on which low carbon heat and transport 
options eventually turn out to be the most 
promising routes to emissions reduction.
Second, the uncertainties that have been discussed 
in this report are interdependent. If particular 
uncertainties are not managed or resolved 
effectively, that can have a knock on effect  - and 
can exacerbate other uncertainties. For example, 
policy (and political) uncertainties about incentives 
for the deployment of low carbon electricity 
generation will tend to increase technological and 
financial uncertainties. As discussed in section 
3 of this report, the flow of finance to the UK 
power sector, and the technological development 
and learning that this would enable, will be 
significantly curtailed if policy frameworks do not 
make investment attractive enough.
Staying on Course?
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Another example is the interaction between 
electricity, transport and heat. If progress with 
electricity decarbonisation does not proceed as 
envisaged in the fourth carbon budget pathway, 
this will reduce the options available for heat and 
transport decarbonisation. Our analysis has shown 
that there are other, sometimes complementary, 
options for heat and transport decarbonisation. 
However, this would make uncertainties about 
these other options such as energy efficiency, 
district heating, hydrogen vehicles and the 
availability of bioenergy more important.
Third, it is also important to consider the 
implications of the wider political uncertainties 
discussed in section 1 of this report. There are clear 
interactions between the uncertainties discussed 
in this report and these political uncertainties. 
Within the political debate, some have argued 
that the UK should downgrade its commitment to 
reducing emissions because this is perceived to be 
too costly. But placing less emphasis on emissions 
reduction is not a cost or risk free option. Other 
uncertainties, and their potential impacts, will be 
much more important in future if emissions do not 
fall as suggested by the 4th carbon budget analysis. 
Clearly, if the UK does not reduce emissions, and 
this trend is matched by similar trends elsewhere 
in the world, the likelihood of significant climate 
change will increase (IPCC, 2014). This would 
make it much more likely that the UK and other 
countries would be subject to large impacts from 
climate change, and all of the costs and other 
implications associated with those impacts.  
Perhaps more immediately, a failure to shift 
quickly enough to a low carbon energy system 
will do little to mitigate uncertainties about the 
price and availability of fossil fuels. Like many 
industrialised countries, the UK’s energy system 
is largely dependent on fossil fuels. If fossil fuel 
prices remain high, or rise further, consumer bills 
are likely to be higher in 2020 than they would be 
if low carbon policies were pursued successfully 
(DECC, 2013b).
While it is impossible to predict future fossil fuel 
prices, it would not be prudent to assume that 
there will be a low fossil fuel price future. The 
shale gas revolution in the United States has led 
to low natural gas prices in that country, but there 
are significant doubts about the extent to which 
shale resources will be developed in the UK – and 
whether such developments would have a similar 
effect on prices (Stevens, 2013). This reinforces the 
need to pursue many of the strategies set out in 
Table 3, particularly those such as energy efficiency 
and diversification that are designed to mitigate 
the exposure of consumers to the energy security 
risks of fossil fuel dependency.
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This report has discussed some of the key 
uncertainties facing the UK’s planned low 
carbon transition, and also identified policies 
and strategies to mitigate or better understand 
these uncertainties. At the outset, the report 
acknowledged the growing political uncertainties 
about the future direction of UK energy policy. 
While the government remains committed to 
emissions reduction, and has legislated carbon 
budgets to the late 2020s, political controversy 
about energy policy goals has the potential to 
compound some of the challenges this report has 
discussed in detail.
As the report has shown, this is just one example 
of the interdependent nature of the uncertainties 
faced by the government, industry, citizens 
and communities. It has also shown that these 
uncertainties operate on different levels – and 
have widely different potential impacts. There are 
specific ‘instrumental’ uncertainties such as those 
that will affect the adoption of electric vehicles 
or the flow of investment to the UK power sector. 
There are also wider ‘systemic’ uncertainties that 
could have more pervasive implications such as 
the impacts of energy system development on 
national and global ecosystems, and the role of 
public attitudes and values in shaping change. 
Some of these uncertainties can be mitigated to 
some extent by government and other actors. 
Others cannot, and imply a need to keep options 
open or to develop and apply new methods of 
analysis to understand them more fully.
In common with the CCC’s analysis, this report 
emphasises the importance of power sector 
decarbonisation by 2030. Our analysis of 
investment capital requirements shows that 
there is no shortage of capital per se. However, 
further changes to policy frameworks, market 
structures and business models may be needed to 
attract that capital to the UK power sector. This is 
partly due to the significant risks associated with 
capital-intensive low carbon power generation 
technologies, some of which are still in their 
demonstration and early deployment phases. It is 
also because it is likely that a diversity of investors 
will be required, given the limits on the potential 
availability of investment capital from traditional 
utilities. The recently announced Competition 
and Markets authority review of the energy 
market should consider this diversity as part of its 
deliberations.
One of the significant challenges for the power 
sector to 2030 is that there are limited large-
scale low carbon options to 2030. All of them 
face different economic, technical and political 
challenges. Of course, smaller scale technologies 
such as solar PV and decentralised bioenergy 
plants have a potentially significant role to 
play too. Given the financial resources required 
and the political tensions about some of these 
technologies (e.g. wind power), it will be tough for 
the government to keep open all options in DECC’s 
‘low carbon race’. Limits to political capital may be 
just as important as any constraints on the flow of 
financial capital. Once there is more information 
about costs and cost trajectories, decisions may 
need to be made to focus on those technologies 
that are the most cost effective.
By contrast, there is more flexibility with respect to 
heat and transport decarbonisation – particularly 
over the period to 2030. While there has been a 
focus on electrification of these sectors in the 
analysis conducted by the CCC, government 
and other bodies, delays with electricity 
decarbonisation would not necessarily be a show 
stopper. However, it would mean that other means 
of decarbonising heating and transport would need 
to receive more attention – and that the impact 
of uncertainties about these would be potentially 
greater. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the 
use of electric heating technologies is still likely 
to be important under this scenario in the longer-
term.
Since it is not yet clear what combination of 
electrification and/or other low carbon options will 
be the best route for reducing transport and heat 
emissions, there should be a continuing emphasis 
on experimentation and demonstration. It is also 
important that the lessons from experiments 
are learned and shared, especially because a 
range of different funding bodies, businesses 
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and other organisations are often involved. Many 
demonstrations are already underway or planned. 
In some cases, these are needed to test and refine 
relatively new technologies. But in many cases, 
the purpose of such demonstrations is to learn 
about non-technical factors such as consumer 
attitudes, business models and the extent to 
which regulatory frameworks need to change. For 
example, district heating networks are not new 
but their relative unfamiliarity in the UK mean 
that there are significant non-technical barriers to 
investment.
One corollary of this greater flexibility is the need 
to place more emphasis on energy efficiency, 
particularly in relation to the use of heat in 
buildings. Further progress with energy efficiency 
can help to buy time if electricity decarbonisation 
and/or the deployment of heat pumps and 
associated electricity network upgrades are not 
as successful as planned. Furthermore, energy 
efficiency will also help to reduce consumers’ 
bills and to make them more resilient to energy 
security risks – particularly those that increase 
fossil fuel prices. It is ironic that the government’s 
level of ambition with respect to household energy 
efficiency policy has been cut back at a time when 
consumer bills are particularly high.
The systemic uncertainties discussed in this report 
also merit more attention by policy makers and 
other actors. In particular, there is a need to move 
beyond narrow framings of public attitudes. All 
too often, expert debates on energy policies and 
choices are potentially counter-productive. Some of 
these debates still focus on ‘persuading the public 
to accept’ a given set of technologies rather than 
engaging the public in the kind of energy system 
they would like to see. In addition, public views 
are sometimes represented in media and political 
discourse about energy systems as fickle, dogmatic, 
and irrational (e.g. Wintour, 2014).
UKERC’s research shows very clearly that broader 
engagement with public perspectives is both 
desirable and necessary. This could not only 
increase the chances of public support for change, 
it could also open up possibilities for compromise 
within public responses. This could include, for 
example, more acceptance of less desirable aspects 
of system change (e.g. some continued fossil fuel 
use) in a context where there is a greater sense 
that the full range of responses and concerns 
are being considered, and where there is a clear 
long-term vision for change around which diverse 
publics can coalesce. This research also shows that 
visions for change should go beyond technologies, 
and should also focus on the way in which the 
energy system could be organised and paid for. 
The transition to a low carbon energy system 
implies a significant reduction in the use of 
fossil fuels. Scaling back the UK’s low carbon 
ambitions would risk prolonging our reliance on 
fossil fuels, and the exposure of consumers and 
the UK economy to the potential impacts of high 
fossil fuel prices. However, natural resources 
will continue to be important if the low carbon 
transition continues as planned. This report has 
shown that the availability and price of fossil fuels 
and bioenergy resources is subject to very large 
uncertainties. Furthermore, controversies and 
concerns about these resources – particularly shale 
gas and biomass – may limit the extent to which 
they can be developed and used. In both cases, 
their use in the UK will be partly affected by global 
trends.
Similarly, the transition to a low carbon energy 
system will have uncertain implications for 
ecosystems – and the services those ecosystems 
provide. All four of the low carbon power 
generation scenarios analysed by the CCC to 2030 
will have upstream consequences for ecosystem 
services outside of the UK and downstream ones 
within it. While the evidence review suggests that 
low carbon technologies will have fewer and/or 
less serious impacts than fossil fuels, it also shows 
that the evidence base is weak. Significant further 
research is needed to strengthen this evidence 
base. Furthermore, new techniques and databases 
are required to inform decisions about energy 
system change within the UK, and to link these 
with their global ecosystem consequences.
Finally, this report has shown that it is not possible 
to resolve many of the uncertainties that will 
impact on the UK’s low carbon plans – at least 
not in the short term. This is what makes policy 
making particularly challenging. But this does not 
mean that nothing can be done. The report has 
highlighted a range of strategies that could be 
used in the face of these uncertainties. In some 
cases, it makes sense to support a diverse range 
of potential technologies and strategies – and to 
experiment and learn about what options are the 
most effective. As our methodological research 
has discussed (Davies et al., 2014), there are also a 
range of tools and techniques that can be applied 
to understand or manage such uncertainties more 
effectively. Of particular importance are methods 
that can deal with more systemic uncertainties, 
and can help to develop responses that are robust 
to a range of potential outcomes. 
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